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Abstract 
In mid-September 2008, prime money market mutual funds (MMMFs) began experiencing 
run-like redemption requests sparked by one fund that had “broken the buck” because of 
large exposure to Lehman Brothers commercial paper (CP). As a result, MMMFs, which are 
significant investors in CP, became reluctant to hold CP. Within a week, outstanding CP had 
been reduced by roughly $300 billion. The CP market experienced severe shortening of 
maturities and increased rates, making it difficult for issuers to place new paper. When 
government efforts to assist the MMMFs did not resolve the stresses in the CP market, the 
Federal Reserve announced, on October 7, 2008, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
(CPFF), which sought to backstop the CP market and revive term lending.  
The CPFF (through a special purpose vehicle) purchased highly rated US dollar–
denominated three-month unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) from 
eligible US issuers. Purchases were funded with loans from the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York (FRBNY). The CPFF was highly utilized in its first weeks, purchasing the overwhelming 
majority of new term CP; its usage then waned as market conditions improved. At its highest 
level, in January 2009, the CPFF held $350 billion—20% of all outstanding CP. The CPFF 
expired on February 1, 2010, with all loans paid in full. The program accumulated 
approximately $5 billion in earnings that was paid to the FRBNY. The program is credited 
with backstopping the market, providing a rollover option for maturing paper, and providing 
much needed year-end financing. Its role in helping to revive the term-lending market, 
however, has been debated, but there is evidence that it did help increase lending between 
CPFF participants and their relationships with nonfinancial corporate borrowers.  
Keywords: short-term funding, commercial paper, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), 
mutual fund, money market mutual fund, liquidity facility, wholesale funding, Lehman 
Brothers, Reserve Primary Fund 
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 









At a Glance 
Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 
September 15, 2008, a number of prime money 
market mutual funds (MMMFs) began to 
experience run-like redemption requests after one 
fund with heavy exposure to Lehman’s commercial 
paper (CP) “broke the buck,” announcing that it 
could no longer maintain its $1 per share net asset 
value (NAV). As a result, MMMFs, which are 
significant investors in CP, retreated from CP. 
Consequently, the CP market experienced severe 
narrowing of terms and a corresponding increase 
in rates, making it difficult for issuers to place new 
paper, especially term paper. When government 
efforts to assist the MMMFs did not resolve the 
stresses in the CP market, the Federal Reserve 
announced on October 7, 2008, the Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).  
Under the CPFF, the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York (FRBNY) made loans to a special purpose 
vehicle—the CPFF LLC—which in turn purchased 
highly rated, US dollar–denominated, three-month 
unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) from eligible US issuers (represented by 
primary dealers). The FRBNY loans were funded 
from its discount window, and interest was 
charged at the target federal funds rate. The 
maturities of each loan mirrored that of the CP 
purchased. The LLC held the CP until maturity and 
repaid the loans to the FRBNY with interest when 
the CP matured.  
Summary Evaluation 
During its first weeks of operation, CPFF LLC purchased the overwhelming majority of newly issued three-
month CP, and the launch of the program led to a significant jump in CP issuance. Assets of the LLC more 
than doubled after one month and reached a peak of $350 billion in January 2009, when the CP it first 
purchased matured and rolled over. After the early weeks, as market conditions improved, utilization of 
the CPFF waned. The last of CPFF LLC’s holdings matured on April 26, 2010, and the LLC was dissolved 
on August 30, 2010. All loans that were made to the LLC by the FRBNY were repaid in full in accordance 
with their terms, and all of the CP that the LLC purchased was repaid in accordance with stated terms. The 
FRBNY received $5 billion in earnings from the LLC as its sole member. The CPFF coexisted with other 
government programs aimed at addressing the stress in the CP market, so it is difficult to fully assess its 
impact. However, the program is credited with backstopping the market, providing a rollover option for 
maturing paper, and assisting year-end financing. Its role in helping to revive the term-lending market, 
however, has been debated, but there is evidence that it did help increase lending between CPFF 
participants and their relationships with nonfinancial corporate borrowers (Li 2015).  
 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To fund indirect purchases of highly rated three-
month unsecured and ABCP from eligible US issuers so as to 
provide liquidity to the CP market and stimulate term 
lending. 
Announcement Date  October 7, 2008 
Operational Date October 27, 2008 
Expiration Date  February 1, 2010  
Dissolution of CPFF LLC August 30, 2010 
Legal Authority Section 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act 
Funding Source FRBNY discount window  
Interest Rate Target federal funds rate 
Peak Utilization  $738 billion aggregate 
purchases; $350 billion 
outstanding (January 2009); 82 
issuers (total) 
CP Eligible for Purchase  Three-month USD-
denominated unsecured and 
ABCP rated at least A-1/P-1/F1 
issued by eligible US issuers 
Special Purpose Vehicle  CPFF LLC 
Administrator FRBNY 
Participants US Department of the Treasury 
contributed $50 billion to 
support the CPFF  
Various expert firms were 
hired to assist the LLC with 
administration and 
investments. 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility  
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Commercial Paper Funding Facility:  United States Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in 
LCU converted to USD) 
 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in 
LCU converted to USD) 
 
$47,976 in 2007 




Sovereign credit rating 
(5-year senior debt) 
 














Size of banking system 
 
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 




Size of banking system 
as a percentage of GDP 
 
62.9% in 2007 




Size of banking system 
as a percentage of 
financial system 
 
Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of financial 
system in 2007 
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of financial 
system in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
 
5-bank concentration of 
banking system 
 
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
 
Foreign involvement in 
banking system 
22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
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of banking system 
 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey 
 
Existence of deposit 
insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 for 
2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 for 
2008 
 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
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On September 16, 2008, the day after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the $62 billion 
Reserve Primary Fund, a money market mutual fund (MMMF) wrote down its $785 million 
exposure to Lehman commercial paper (CP), which caused it to “break the buck,” and it 
announced a net asset value (NAV) of less than $1 per share. Since investors tended to 
believe their MMMF holdings were as good as cash (only one MMMF had ever broken the 
buck before), the fund’s announcement prompted run-like redemption requests by many 
MMMF investors, and in the following week, investors withdrew $117 billion from prime 
MMMFs (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011).  
As they scrambled for cash to meet redemptions and maintain their expected $1-per-share 
NAVs, MMMFs, which in the aggregate are significant investors in CP, refused to roll over the 
maturing CP they held or to purchase new CP. A month after Lehman’s bankruptcy, 
outstanding CP had declined by $300 billion (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011). 
Seventy percent of this decline was a flight from financial CP, which was CP issued by banks 
and other financial institutions, which is traditionally unsecured. Seventy-five percent of the 
remaining CP was being rolled over daily, in contrast to traditionally being issued with 
maturities of 30 days or more (Anderson and Gascon 2009). After September 2008, this 
contraction in maturities was coupled with sharply elevated rates, all but freezing the market 
for term CP and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). 
Concerned that stresses on the MMMFs and seizing up of the CP market might have negative 
effects on the financial system and possibly spill over to the broader economy, the 
government took steps to counter the stresses, including an optional guarantee of MMMF 
accounts against losses resulting from a fund breaking the buck3 and the indirect purchase 
of high-quality ABCP from MMMFs that experienced investor runs.4 Although these actions 
helped to protect the MMMFs, and forestall their selling assets at greatly depressed prices, 
they did not fill the gap in demand for CP created by the exit of MMMFs, nor did CP rates 
stabilize.  
Program Description 
On October 7, 2008, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) announced the Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility (CPFF), which was intended to provide a liquidity backstop to the CP market 
by funding the purchase of highly rated CP from issuers and “to improve liquidity in short-
term funding markets and thereby increase the availability of credit for businesses and 
households” (Federal Reserve 2008a; Federal Reserve 2008c). The CPFF was established 
pursuant to the Fed’s emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act 
of 1913 (FRA)5 and was funded from the Fed’s discount window (FRBNY 2009).  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
3 US Treasury Temporary Guarantee Programs for Money Market Funds. Also see McNamara (2016) discussing 
the guarantee program. 
4 See Wiggins (forthcoming) discussing the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility (AMLF). 
5 Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Section 13(3) (12 U.S.C. § 343)—“Discount of Obligations Arising out of Actual 
Commercial Transactions, as Amended.” 
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A designer of CPFF comments that it was regarded by many Fed staffers as the program that 
most pushed the envelope of what was legal under FRA Section 13(3). This was because the 
Fed was effectively lending on a mostly unsecured basis and relying on accumulated upfront 
fees to cover potential losses. At the time, this structure was intensely debated. 
Under the CPFF, the Fed purchased highly rated, US dollar–denominated, three-month 
unsecured CP and ABCP from a wide range of eligible financial and nonfinancial US issuers 
(FRBNY 2009). The purchases were made indirectly through a newly established special 
purpose vehicle, CPFF LLC, which was administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York (FRBNY), the LLC’s managing, and only, member (Adiran, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 
2011). 
As shown in Figure 1, under the CPFF, the FRBNY loaned funds to the LLC, which then 
purchased and held eligible CP from the primary dealers that represented eligible issuers. 
The FRBNY loans were secured by all of the assets of the LLC, including the CP purchased, 
assets purchased with the accumulated upfront fees paid by the issuers, any uninvested fees, 
and any earnings. The rate charged to the LLC on loans from the FRBNY was the same as the 
targeted federal funds rate charged to depository institutions that borrowed from the Fed’s 
discount window, and the term of each loan mirrored the three-month term of the CP 
purchased. When the CP matured, the LLC repaid the loan to the FRBNY with interest. All 
assets and liabilities of the LLC were consolidated onto the balance sheet of the FRBNY. 
Eligible Issuers 
Issuers eligible to sell CP to the CPFF were US issuers of CP, including US issuers with a 
foreign parent company (FRBNY 2009). Each legal entity that issues CP was considered a 
separate issuer under the CPFF. 
Figure 1: Issuance to the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) 
 
Note: Solid Lines represent steps in the transaction; dashed lines represent some of the control. 
Source: Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011. 
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An issuer with an eligible foreign parent, however, could not sell to the LLC any CP issued by 
other parts of the organization. In addition, in determining its Maximum Face Value6 (which 
was the maximum amount of CP that a participating issuer could have outstanding on any 
day) such issuer would not include any commercial paper issued by other parts of the 
organization (FRBNY 2009). 
Issuers who wished to access the CPFF were required to register with the Fed at least two 
business days in advance of their intended use of the CPFF by submitting the completed 
Issuer Registration Documents and paying the facility registration fee of 10 basis points 
(0.1%) on their Maximum Face Value (FRBNY 2009). 
CPFF Purchased 
The CPFF purchased only three-month, US dollar–denominated unsecured CP and ABCP that 
was rated at least A-1/P-1/F1 by a nationally recognized statistical rating organization 
(NRSRO) (FRBNY 2009). If rated by multiple NRSROs, the CP had to be rated at least A-1/P-
1/F1 by two or more NRSROs. 
As was the market custom, the LLC purchased CP at a discount from face value (FRBNY 
2009). The applicable discount was based on a rate equal to a spread over the three-month 
overnight index swap (OIS) rate on the day of purchase. The spread for unsecured CP was 
100 basis points per annum, and the spread for ABCP was 300 basis points per annum. For 
unsecured CP, an additional 100 basis points per annum was imposed as a credit 
enhancement fee, to be paid on each trade execution date. This fee was to compensate the 
Fed for the higher risk involved with respect to unsecured CP and to ensure that the lending 
was “indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Bank,” a 
requirement of Section 13(3) of the FRA. An issuer of unsecured CP that participated in the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s) Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program 
(TLGP),7  which was implemented on October 14, 2008, could avoid the credit enhancement 
fee for issues covered by the TLGP, which was accepted by the CPFF as a satisfactory 
guarantee (FRBNY 2009).  The CPFF provided same-day settlement, operating as an 
immediate source of funds. 
Use of Third Parties 
The FRBNY relied on a combination of existing and new infrastructure to implement the 
CPFF and sought the input of market participants when deciding on the terms and 
operational details of the CPFF (Federal Reserve 2008c). For example, the FRBNY required 
each CP issuer to utilize a primary dealer as an issuing agent, even if the issuer usually placed 
its CP directly. In this way, the Fed relied on the primary dealers’ market knowledge and 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6 The Maximum Face Value was calculated as the greatest amount of US dollar–denominated A-1/P-1/F1 CP 
that the issuer had outstanding on any day between January 1 and August 31, 2008 (Registration Instructions). 
The Registration Instructions also provided that, “[i]f the Issuer has more than one commercial paper program, 
[the Maximum Face Value] should be the aggregate amount outstanding under all programs on a single day and 
all of the Issuer’s programs should be listed below …  The Issuer agrees that while participating in this Facility, 
it will not sell commercial paper to the CPFF such that the total amount of commercial paper outstanding 
(including commercial paper held by the CPFF and other investors) would exceed the Maximum Face Value.” 
7 On October 14, 2008, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) implemented the Temporary 
Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) consisting of two components: (1) the Transaction Account Guarantee 
Program (TAGP), an FDIC guarantee in full of noninterest-bearing transaction accounts; and (2) the Debt 
Guarantee Program (DGP), an FDIC guarantee of certain newly issued senior unsecured debt (FDIC, n.d.). 
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their verification of potential issuers’ creditworthiness based on established market criteria 
(Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011). 
In similar fashion, the FRBNY hired Pacific Investment Management Company, LLC (PIMCO) 
to advise it in setting up the CPFF infrastructure and to provide transaction agent and 
investment management services (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011). It hired State 
Street Bank and Trust (State Street) to hold custody of the LLC’s assets and perform its 
administrative functions. (The LLC had no employees. State Street, in essence, operated on 
its behalf.) The Depository Trust Company, which traditionally cleared CP transactions for 
the primary dealers and State Street, among others, also provided these services for the 
CPFF.  
The consultation with and use of experts enabled the Fed to begin issuer preregistration for 
the CPFF on October 20, 2008, and to make the first purchases of CP pursuant to the CPFF 
on October 27, 2008, just 20 days after the facility’s announcement (Adrian, Kimbrough, and 
Marchioni 2011). 
Outcomes 
Usage of the CPFF was aggressive, and rates on CP in the market fell precipitously as soon as 
the program was announced. On the first day of operation, the CPFF purchased more than 
$50 billion of CP; in its first week, $144 billion. During the next few weeks, it purchased the 
overwhelming majority of newly issued three-month CP. Assets of the CPFF more than 
doubled after one month, reaching $293 billion by the end of November 2008, and reached 
$333 billion by the end of December 2008. The CPFF reached its peak of $350 billion—the 
maximum amount outstanding at any one time—during the third week of January 2009, 
when the CP first purchased by the CPFF matured and was rolled over. At this time, the LLC 
owned 20% of all outstanding CP (Anderson and Gascon 2009). 
Figure 2 illustrates the CPFF’s share of new issues and outstanding CP during its tenure. 
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Figure 2: CPFF Share of Purchases and Outstanding Commercial Paper 
 
Source: FRB, H.4.1 Table; Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Anderson and Gascon 2009). 
 
In total, the CPFF purchased an aggregate of $738 billion in CP, including $342 billion of ABCP 
(Li 2015). Eighty-two issuers participated in the CPFF; however, when aggregated at the 
sponsor level, it is evident that usage was somewhat concentrated as the top 10 issuers 
accounted for approximately $474 billion, or more than half of the program total. 
Approximately 10% of the purchased CP was from nonfinancial corporations or their finance 
affiliates, such as General Electric Company, Ford Motor Company, General Motors 
Corporation, and BMW (Li 2015; van Deventer 2011). 
Figure 3 shows the patterns of usage of the CPFF by the 10 largest sponsors. Included are a 
number of large financial institutions and nonfinancial institutions that were known to be 
having difficulties at the time, such as American International Group, Dexia SA, Fortis SA/NV, 
and Citigroup (van Deventer 2011). Notably, this grouping included a number of US 
subsidiaries of foreign banks, with UBS-related issuers having the most CP purchased by the 
program. In aggregate, banks with European parents accounted for nearly 60% of the 









As market conditions improved, utilization of the CPFF waned. By December 2009, the 
facility held only $10 billion of assets, and by April 2010, the balance fell to zero. The 
aggregate lent under the facility during its tenure was $738 billion. In terms of dollars 
expended, it was the third-largest program implemented by the Fed to combat the financial 
crisis. Only the Term Auction Facility (TAF)8 and the US dollar swaps with foreign central 
banks9 were larger.  
The CPFF expired on February 1, 2010. All loans that were made to the LLC by the FRBNY 
were repaid in full in accordance with the terms of the facility, and all the CP that the LLC 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
8 See Wiggins and Metrick 2016a for a discussion of the Term Auction Facility (TAF).  
9 See Wiggins and Metrick 2016b for a discussion of the US dollar swaps with foreign central banks. 
Figure 3: Ten Largest Sponsors That Utilized the Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
(CPFF)  
























60,230.602 90 CP 1.908 0.711 
Dexia SA 53,476.301 42 CP 1.370 1.000 
Hudson Castle 53,343.199 48 ABCP 3.320 0.000 
BSN Holdings 42,794.000 57 ABCP 3.326 0.000 
The Liberty 
Hampshire Company 
41,379.801 36 ABCP 3.365 0.000 
Barclays PLC 38,774.898 7 CP 1.320 1.000 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group 
38,517.000 67 ABCP 2.975 0.164 
Fortis Bank SA/NV 38,483.699 69 ABCP 3.173 0.072 
Citigroup 32,735.000 10 ABCP 2.711 0.000 
Total 474,265.602 437    
Note: This table illustrates the 10 largest sponsors by total amount that used the Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility during the period of October 27, 2008, to February 1, 2010. The names are 
shown at t h e  sponsor level instead of issuer level. This information is collected from the 
Federal Reserve Board. The “Amount (millions)” column indicates the total amount of 
CP/ABCP purchased by the Federal Reserve. The “Frequency” column shows the total numbers 
of transactions. The “Discount Rate” column denotes the lending fee for accessing the CPFF, 
which was equal to a three-month OIS rate plus 100 basis points per annum for unsecured 
commercial paper. The discount rate imposed for asset-backed commercial paper was a three-
month OIS plus 300 basis points. The “Credit Enhancement” column indicates the surcharge 
of a 100 basis point per annum fee paid up front on each sale of commercial paper to the 
CPFF LLC in the cases without any collateral. 
Source: Li 2015. 
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purchased was repaid in accordance with stated terms. The last of the LLC’s holdings 
matured on April 26, 2010, and it was dissolved on August 30, 2010. The LLC accumulated 
nearly $5 billion in earnings, primarily from interest income, credit enhancement fees, and 
registration fees, which was paid to the FRBNY as managing member. 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The CPFF was established under the Federal Reserve’s emergency powers under 
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. 
In establishing the CPFF, the Fed relied on its authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act, which permits the Federal Reserve Board (the Board), in unusual and exigent 
circumstances, to authorize Reserve Banks to extend credit to individuals, partnerships, and 
corporations that are unable to obtain adequate credit accommodations. Federal Reserve 
counsel cited a litany of events10 in its memorandum analyzing the deteriorating market 
conditions and found that they were directly affecting the broader economy “[b]y restricting 
the availability of credit” and “disrupt[ing] the commercial paper market and other forms of 
financing for a wide range of firms.” (Alvarez et al. 2009). Counsel then concluded that there 
was manifest evidence that “unusual and exigent circumstances” existed sufficient to 
support the Board’s authorization of the CPFF under Section 13(3) of the FRA and also 
“sufficient evidence to support a judgment that adequate credit accommodations for eligible 
issuers of term CP are not available from other banking institutions” (Alvarez et al. 2009). 
The CPFF represented a shift in the Fed’s policy approach to the crisis because it was a direct 
effort to backstop a particular credit market that was failing. Further, through the CPFF, the 
Fed in effect extended its discount window lending well beyond the entities to which it 
traditionally lent—depository institutions and primary dealers—to provide liquidity to a 
wide variety of financial and nonfinancial entities of varying sizes. Given the limited tools 
available to the Fed, the CPFF in essence enabled it to utilize its pool of funds in a new way 
to combat the deepening crisis.   
A designer of CPFF comments that it was regarded by many Fed staffers as the program that 
most pushed the envelope of what was legal under FRA Section 13(3). This was because the 
Fed was effectively lending on a mostly unsecured basis and relying on accumulated upfront 
fees to cover potential losses. At the time, this structure was intensely debated. 
2. The FRBNY determined that the CPFF loans were “indorsed or otherwise secured 
to [its] satisfaction” as required by Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. 
The wording of FRA Section 13(3) is broad and permits a Federal Reserve Bank discretion 
to determine whether it is “secured to [its] satisfaction” in acting under the section. CPFF 
design elements—having issuers preregister and be vetted, requiring use of a primary 
dealer, upfront registration fees, credit quality, pricing, and maximum issuance amount—
were structured with the intent to protect the Fed from associated risks. Moreover, the legal 
staffs of the Board and the FRBNY were involved in providing advice regarding the 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
10 Developments cited included: (1) that for the past year, “the CP market has been under considerable strain 
as money market mutual funds (MMMFs) and other investors have become increasingly reluctant to purchase 
CP”; (2) that financial systems in the US and abroad were under “extraordinary stress, particularly the credit 
and money markets”; and (3) that banks were “constrained in their ability to lend” and others were reluctant 
to lend to them (Alvarez et al. 2009). 
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design and implementation of the CPFF and concluded that the FRBNY could reasonably 
determine that its loans to the LLC would be adequately secured on several levels:  
• Under the CPFF, the FRBNY’s loans to the LLC would be secured by all of the assets of 
the LLC, including the CP purchased, assets purchased with the accumulated upfront 
fees paid by the issuers, any uninvested fees, and any earnings. In addition, the CP 
eligible for purchase under the facility would be highly rated, and purchases would 
be subject to a discount from face value. Based on the sum of these facts, counsel 
concluded that the FRBNY could reasonably conclude that all loans to the LLC would 
be “secured to [its] satisfaction” with respect to all loans to the LLC. 
 
Counsel further determined that if individual purchases of ABCP were considered, the 
FRBNY could reasonably reach a similar conclusion because the ABCP was 
collateralized by the pools of assets underlying the ABCP, even though these pools 
might dip below the face value of the ABCP. Moreover, the risk of a drop in value was 
somewhat mitigated by the discount applied at purchase. 
 
• With respect to individual purchases of unsecured CP, counsel found that the credit 
premium fee of 100 basis points charged acted as an insurance premium (Alvarez et 
al. 2009). This fee, together with the facility registration fee of 10 basis points on the 
Maximum Face Value charged to each issuer, provided a pool11 to compensate the 
FRBNY for any losses resulting from the CP. 
3. The FRBNY outsourced certain key CPFF administrative functions.  
The Fed had to build new legal, trading, investment, custodial, and administrative 
infrastructure for CPFF operations as well as establish essential financial and operational 
risk controls. Time was of the essence, so the Fed accessed market expertise and operational 
efficiencies through contracted third parties that regularly participated in the CP market: 
• PIMCO advised the FRBNY in setting up the CPFF infrastructure and provided 
transaction agent and investment management services. 
• State Street provided administrative and custodial services (in essence, it held the LLC 
in custody and performed all its administrative functions). The LLC had no 
employees.  
• Primary dealers acted as agents verifying issuers’ eligibility. Since they had 
established relationships with the FRBNY and actively underwrote, placed, and made 
a market in CP, they were well suited to intermediate between the CP issuers and the 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
11 The transcript from a Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting that occurred a week after the CPFF 
began preregistration reflects that, “[a]t the close of business last week [the first week of CPFF operations], 79 
issuers had registered to use the facility, paying 10 basis points, or $580 million, to cover the potential issuance 
of commercial paper. The 10 basis point fee provides a little equity to get the program off and running” (FOMC 
2008b). The CPFF also accepted participation in the FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program in lieu of 
the credit enhancement fee. 
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Fed. Issuers were required to sell through a primary dealer even if the issuer normally 
issued its CP directly without use of an agent (Registration Instructions). 
• Depository Trust Company, which traditionally cleared CP transactions for the 
primary dealers, CP issuing and payment agents (hired by issuers), and State Street, 
provided these services for the CPFF. This permitted the CPFF to purchase CP through 
the market’s standard clearing institution and provided same-day settlement, which 
made it a viable option for issuers facing unexpected liquidity needs (Registration 
Instructions). 
Combining existing and new infrastructure and incorporating market expertise in this 
manner permitted the Fed to: (1) analyze a number of options in designing the facility, such 
as fees and managing credit risk, hypothetical losses, and moral hazard; and (2) design a 
structure that was consistent with market standards and easily accessible to a wide number 
of potential issuers (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011). Use of experts also helped 
make the CPFF operational by October 27, 2008, just 20 days after its announcement. 
4. The CPFF was limited to “legacy issuers,” those that had issued CP before the 
adoption of the CPFF.  
The CPFF was intended to address the gap in funding caused by recent market disruptions, 
not to be an additional liquidity channel. Thus, the CPFF was originally available only to 
“legacy issuers,” any company that had issued CP before its inception, including those with a 
foreign parent. In January 2009, the Fed further clarified this eligibility criterion with respect 
to ABCP issuers. Such an issuer was deemed to have been inactive (and thus not eligible to 
participate in the CPFF) if the issuer had not issued ABCP to institutions other than the 
sponsoring institution for any period of three consecutive months or longer between January 
1 and August 31, 2008 (FRBNY, CPFF: FAQs Jan. 23, 2009). This modification reinforced the 
original intent of the facility and sought to limit moral hazard by excluding issuances that “no 
longer had a natural investor base,” and mitigated the risk of funding issuers that the market 
had withdrawn from for reasons unrelated to the crisis (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 
2011). 
5. There were no restrictions on the type of entity that could borrow under the CPFF, 
subject to being a US entity and “legacy issuer.” 
In implementing the CPFF, the Fed decided that because of the broad nature of the CP market, 
to be an effective backstop the CPFF had to be accessible to a “large cross-section of the 
commercial-paper market while minimizing credit risk to the Reserve Bank” (Adrian, 
Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011). CP issuers were a varied group of financial and 
nonfinancial entities. Issuers eligible to utilize the CPFF had to be US entities, and included 
US subsidiaries of foreign companies. However, any type of US company meeting the 
definition of “legacy issuer” could utilize the CPFF. A narrower facility—for example, one 
limited to financial entities—might not have addressed the issue of spillover to the real 
economy. 
Because the group of potential issuers was much broader than the limited types of firms the 
Fed usually dealt with (depository institutions and primary dealers), it relied on its primary 
dealers, which had CP market expertise and knowledge of issuers, as intermediaries. The 
terms of the CPFF required issuers to sell through one or more primary dealer(s), even if the 
issuer normally issued its CP directly. In this way, there was one additional check on 
potential issuers’ creditworthiness.  
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6. US subsidiaries of foreign companies were permitted to borrow under the CPFF. 
US subsidiaries of foreign companies were eligible to borrow under the CPFF as long as they 
otherwise met the definition of “legacy issuer.” An analysis of the CPFF transaction data 
shows that, on average, European banks had borrowings of $145.5 billion, 57.3% of the 
average outstanding borrowings under the CPFF. A number of banks that were experiencing 
well-reported difficulties were among the list of top borrowers, including UBS, Dexia SA, 
Royal Bank of Scotland, and Fortis SA/NV (van Deventer 2011). 
7. The amount of CP that could be purchased from any one issuer was limited.  
The maximum amount of a single issuer’s commercial paper that CPFF LLC could own at any 
time was “the greatest amount of US dollar-denominated A-1/P-1/F1 commercial paper the 
issuer had outstanding on any day between January 1 and August 31, 2008.”  This amount 
was called the “Maximum Face Value.” If an issuer had more than one CP program, the 
Maximum Face Value would be the aggregate amount outstanding under all programs on a 
single day. In addition, by executing the CPFF Issuer Registration Form and Qualification 
Certification, the issuer agreed that while participating in the CPFF, it would not sell CP to 
the CPFF such that the total amount of CP outstanding (including CP held by the CPFF and 
other investors) would exceed the Maximum Face Value. These limitations helped to 
maximize availability of the CPFF. 
8. Fees and lending rates were structured to maximize availability while 
discouraging arbitrage and moral hazard.  
Similar to a bank loan commitment fee, a facility registration fee of 10 basis points (0.1%) 
times the issuer’s Maximum Face Value was required for issuers seeking to utilize the CPFF. 
The fee was payable upon registration and nonrefundable, even if the issuer never issued CP 
under the CPFF. General Electric, whose GE Capital unit was the largest US issuer of CP in 
October 2008 (and traditionally a direct issuer), registered and announced plans to use the 
program that it called “good for the market and very important for the buyers of GE paper as 
it provide[d] a secondary market” (Layne 2008). 
As was the market custom, the CP was purchased at a discount from face value. The CP 
purchased by the LLC was discounted based on a rate equal to a spread over the three-month 
OIS rate on the day of purchase. As shown in Figure 4, the spread for unsecured commercial 
paper was 100 basis points per annum and the spread for ABCP was 300 basis points per 
annum.  
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Figure 4: Applicable Rates and Fees under the CPFF  
Type of Fee Type of CP 
 Unsecured ABCP 
Lending Rate 
(Discount/Haircut) 
3-month overnight index swap 
rate (OIS) + 100 bps 
3-month overnight index swap 
rate (OIS) + 300 bps 
Unsecured Credit 
Surcharge 
100 bps on settlement  None 
Total 3-month OIS + 200 bps 3-month OIS + 300 bps 
Registration Fee 10 bps x Maximum Face Value  10 bps x Maximum Face Value 
Source: FRBNY CPFF: Program Terms and Conditions, Effective October 14, 2008.  
For unsecured CP, a credit enhancement fee of 100 basis points was charged on settlement. 
This was to compensate the Fed for the higher risk involved and to ensure that the Fed was 
“secured to [its] satisfaction” with respect to the unsecured CP, a requirement of FRA Section 
13(3). However, this fee could be waived if the issuer participated in the FDIC’s TLGP (FRBNY 
2009). 
Fees under the CPFF were originally lower than market rates but were designed to be 
unattractive when the market recovered, creating a disincentive for issuers to continue to 
utilize the CPFF. As was expected, as the market recovered, usage of the CPFF declined. In 
extending the CPFF to February 1, 2010, the Federal Reserve explained “[i]nterest rates 
posted on the CPFF are at levels that are increasingly unattractive for many borrowers as 
market conditions improve, and accordingly usage of the CPFF is declining fairly steadily” 
(Federal Reserve 2009b). 
9. CPFF accepted only highly rated US dollar–denominated, three-month CP and 
ABCP for purchase. 
CP eligible for purchase by the CPFF was only that rated A-1/P-1/F1, unsecured or asset-
backed. Consistent with Rule 2a-7 (which provides restrictions governing MMMFs), per fund 
conventions, a split rating was acceptable if two ratings were top-tier. In the time between 
Lehman’s bankruptcy and the CPFF starting operations, outstanding CP dropped by $300 
billion, and 70% of this decline was due to financial CP (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 
2011; Anderson and Gascon 2009). ABCP, which was widely used to finance consumer and 
commercial assets and which had experienced substantial contraction during 2007, 
experienced a much smaller drop, but maintaining this type of consumer and small business 
funding was perceived as key to containing the crisis. Since highly rated CP constituted 
nearly 90% of the market at the time, limiting the eligible CP to these criteria still enabled 
the Fed to backstop almost the entire market while also shielding the Fed from CP with 
greater credit risk (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011). 
10.  Purchases under the CPFF were limited to three-month CP. 
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When the CPFF was enacted, 75% of newly issued CP had a maturity of one to four days. 
Because the CPFF was designed to offer funding beyond what was already available in the 
market, its focus became term lending. Traditionally, CP has been more liquid at one- and 
three-month maturities, and since there were funding concerns for the approaching year 
end, the Fed decided that the CPFF would purchase only three-month CP. Further, providing 
term funding also helped to mitigate rollover risk. Issuers could place CP for longer periods 
than the short maturities that the market was then accepting, and the Fed believed that this 
would provide additional stability to the market because issuers did not have to immediately 
look to refinance such amounts (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011). 
11.  The Federal Reserve utilized a special purpose vehicle, CPFF LLC, to purchase CP 
under the CPFF rather than purchase and hold it directly. 
The FRBNY administered the CPFF and provided three-month loans to the LLC. The LLC 
would then use the funds to purchase eligible commercial paper from eligible issuers 
through a primary dealer as issuing agent. The FRBNY’s loans were secured by the LLC’s 
assets, including the CP that it purchased, fees that it collected and any uninvested fees, and 
earnings and proceeds from investments. This structure was chosen because the Fed would 
be dealing in a security that it did not normally handle and with many types of entities that 
it did not normally lend to. (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011). 
12.  The CPFF was funded through loans from the FRBNY discount window.  
Each week, the FRBNY loaned funds to CPFF LLC through the custodian, which would then 
transfer the funds to the LLC. The LLC would then purchase the CP, which operated as 
security for the loans, from the primary dealers (acting as the issuers’ issuing and payment 
agents). When the CP matured, the issuer paid the LLC the principal plus interest. CPFF LLC 
then repaid the FRBNY the principal of its loan and interest at the federal funds target rate 
on the original loan date. The US Treasury also made a special deposit of $50 billion to the 
FRBNY in support of the CPFF (Federal Reserve 2009a; FOMC 2008a).   
III. Evaluation 
GE Capital registered for the CPFF on October 23 and first accessed the facility on October 
27, 2008. It commented favorably on the facility in a statement to its investors made on 
November 12, 2008: 
While we have continued to issue our commercial paper without disruption, we 
believe this facility has added an important liquidity backstop to the $1.6 trillion 
commercial paper (CP) market, helping to reduce rollover risk for participating 
issuers and providing support for a more active secondary market. The CPFF has 
strengthened confidence in the prime commercial paper market and has resulted in 
more term buying, thus extending our average maturity range. We are eligible to 
access the CPFF for up to $98 billion. 
This facility in addition to the recently announced Money Market Investor Funding 
Facility will provide significant support for the CP market. We are seeing maturities 
extending and improved pricing in the market as a result of this program. (GEC 2008) 
In testifying before the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services on 
November 18, 2008, then–Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke also cited the impact of 
the CPFF as favorable: “[It has] allow[ed] many firms to extend significant amounts of 
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funding into next year,” resulting in “greater stability in money market mutual funds and the 
commercial paper market” (Bernanke 2008).   
A report that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) received at its January 2009 
meeting described the impact of the CPFF and other Fed liquidity measures directed at the 
CP market: 
Conditions in the commercial paper (CP) market improved over the intermeeting 
period, likely reflecting recent measures taken in support of this market, greater 
demand from institutional investors, and the passing of year-end. Yields and spreads 
on 30-day A1/P1 nonfinancial and financial CP as well as on asset-backed commercial 
paper (ABCP) declined modestly and remained low. Yields and spreads on 30-day 
A2/P2 CP, which is not eligible for purchase under the CPFF, dropped sharply after 
the beginning of the year as some institutional investors reportedly reentered the 
market. The dollar amounts of outstanding unsecured financial and nonfinancial CP 
and ABCP rose slightly, on net, over the intermeeting period. This small change was 
more than accounted for by the increase in CP held by the CPFF. In contrast, credit 
extended under the AMLF declined over the intermeeting period. (FOMC 2009) 
As noted above, the CPFF coexisted with other government programs aimed at addressing 
the stress impacting the CP market, so it is difficult to assess its independent impact. In 
explaining the high usage of the CPFF, however, Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni (2011) 
point to two factors: (1) its directness and (2) its scope:   
First, the CPFF addressed problems in short-term debt markets at their root—
through direct lending to issuers—at a time when issuers faced potential liquidity 
shortfalls as a result of market dislocations. Indeed, the main factor distinguishing the 
CPFF from the other two facilities [the Asset-backed Commercial Paper Money 
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility and the Money Market Investor Funding 
Facility (MMIFF)] is the CPFF’s role as a backstop to issuers, whereas the other 
facilities [indirectly] provide emergency lending to institutional money market 
investors. Second, the CPFF backstopped issuance of both unsecured and secured 
commercial paper, while the AMLF funded only ABCP and the MMIFF special-purpose 
vehicles purchased only certificates of deposit, bank notes, and commercial paper 
from specific financial institutions. (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011) 
Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni also conclude that usage of the CPFF was accompanied 
by a narrowing of the spread between CP rates and comparable OIS  rates.  
Anderson and Gascon (2009) credits the CPFF with successfully backstopping the CP market, 
providing a rollover option for maturing paper, and assisting year-end financing. However, 
the authors that its role in helping to revive the term lending market is less certain, although 
it was a substantial purchaser in its early weeks. Additionally, they find that some CP issuers 
that participated in CPFF turned to the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program of the FDIC, 
which guaranteed bank debt at far longer maturities.  
In a more recent paper, Li (2015) explores the impact of the CPFF on those banks that used 
it and concludes that it generated several favorable effects. Banks that participated in the 
CPFF experienced reduced rollover risks and significant positive abnormal stock returns 
during the tenure of the CPFF. Second, banks that used the CPFF also increased the quantity 
of the loans that they made and decreased the yield on loans for firms with which they had 
strong past relationships. Thus, Li concludes, the CPFF generated strong positive spillover 
effects from the financial institutions that utilized it to those financial and nonfinancial 
entities with which they had preexisting relationships, increasing the supply of liquidity. 
190





Adrian, Tobias, Karin J. Kimbrough, and Dina Marchioni. 2011. “The Federal Reserve’s 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility.” FRBNY Economic Policy Review 17, no. 1 (May): 25–39. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AdrianKimbroughMarchion
i2011_0.pdf. 
Alvarez, Scott G., Richard M. Ashton, Kieran J. Fallon, Mark E. Van Der Weide, and Sophia H. 
Allison. 2009. “Authority of the Federal Reserve to Provide Extensions of Credit in 
Connection with a Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).” Memo to File from Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors Legal Division, March 9, 2009. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AlvarezAshtonFallonWeide
Allison2009.pdf. 
Anderson, Richard G., and Charles S. Gascon. 2009. “The Commercial Paper Market, the Fed, 




Bernanke, Ben S. 2008. “Troubled Asset Relief Program and the Federal Reserve’s Liquidity 
Facilities.” Testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of 
Representatives, November 18, 2008. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Troubled%20Asset%20Reli
ef%20Program%20and%20the%20Federal%20Reserve's%20liquidity%20facilities.pdf. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve 2008a. “Board 
Announces Creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to Help Provide 




Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve 2008c. “Board 
announces additional details regarding the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).” 




Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve 2009a. “Report Pursuant 
to Section 129 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility,” February 19, 2009. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Federal-Reserve-2009a.pdf.  
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve 2009b. “Federal Reserve 
Announces Extensions of and Modifications to a Number of Its Liquidity Programs.” Press 










Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. FDIC n.d. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FDIC-n.d..pdf. 
Federal Open Market Committee. FOMC 2008a. Minutes of the Federal Open Market 
Committee on October 28-29, 2008. [Minutes for the October 7, 2008, conference call begin 
on page 10.] 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/fomcminutes20081029.pdf. 
Federal Open Market Committee. FOMC 2008b. Transcript of the Federal Open Market 
Committee Meeting on October 28–29, 2008. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FOMC-2008b.pdf. 




Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Section 13(3) (12 U.S.C. § 343). “Discount of Obligations Arising 
out of Actual Commercial Transactions, as Amended” 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRA_Section_13_Sept_19_20
08_0.pdf. 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. FRBNY n.d. “Commercial Paper Funding Facility (2008).” 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Commercial%20Paper%20
Funding%20Facility%20(2008).pdf. 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. FRBNY 2009. “Commercial Paper Funding Facility: 
Frequently Asked Questions, Effective October 19, 2009.” 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Commercial%20Paper%20
Funding%20Facility%20Frequently%20Asked%20Questions.pdf. 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. FRBNY, CPFF: FAQs Jan. 23, 2009. “Change to CPFF 




Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Registration Instructions. “Registration Instructions: 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).” 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/RegistrationInstructions.pdf
. 
General Electric Capital Corporation. GEC 2008. Letter to the Investment Community, 
November 12, 2008. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/GE_Capital%20Letter_1112
2008.pdf 
Layne, Rachel. 2008. “GE Used New Fed Commercial-Paper Funding Facility.” 
Bloomberg.com, October 27, 2008. Retrieved June 29, 2017, from Bloomberg Professional. 
Li, Bo. 2015. “The Real Effects of Government Liquidity Provision: Evidence from the 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility” (November 1, 2015). “How Effective Was the Federal 
Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility? Evidence from Stock Performance and Loan 
192




Provisions” (March 25, 2014). PBCSF-NIFR Research Paper No. 14-02. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Li2015_1.pdf.  
van Deventer, Donald R. 2011. “Ranking of the 82 Borrowers under the Federal Reserve’s 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility.” Kamakura Corporation, August 29, 2011 (Updated 




Wiggins, Rosalind Z. Forthcoming. “The Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market 




Wiggins, Rosalind Z., and Andrew Metrick. 2016a. “The Federal Reserve’s Crisis Response A: 
Lending and Credit Programs for Depository Institutions.” Yale Program on Financial 




Wiggins, Rosalind Z., and Andrew Metrick. 2016b. “The Federal Reserve’s Crisis Response C: 
Providing US Dollars to Foreign Central Banks” Yale Program on Financial Stability Case 




V. Key Program Documents 
Summary of Program 
FRBNY CPFF: Program Terms and Conditions: Effective June 25, 2009 – FRBNY documents 
outlining the key terms of the CPFF. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_Terms_and_Condition
s.pdf. 
FRBNY CPFF: Program Terms and Conditions: Effective October 14, 2008 – outlines the major 
rules and requirements of applying for eligibility and participating in the CPFF. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_Terms_and_Condition
s_Oct08.pdf. 




FRBNY CPFF: Program Terms and Conditions: Effective February 3, 2009 – extends the 
facility’s tenure. 
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FRBNY CPFF: Program Terms and Conditions: Effective June 25, 2009 – extends the facility’s 
tenure and modifies certain terms. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_Terms_and_Condition
s_June09.pdf. 
FRBNY CPFF: Frequently Asked Questions: Effective October 19, 2009 – FRBNY documents 




FRBNY CPFF: Frequently Asked Questions: Effective January 23, 2009 – Early FAQ document 
articulating details of the CPFF program. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_FAQ_Jan09.pdf. 
FRBNY CPFF: Frequently Asked Questions: Effective February 3, 2009 –  FAQ document from 
the FRBNY answering questions that arose between January 23, 2009 and February 3, 2009. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_FAQ_Feb09.pdf. 
FRBNY CPFF: Frequently Asked Questions: Effective June 25, 2009 – Final FAQ document on 
the CPFF issued by the FRBNY. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_FAQ_June09.pdf. 
Implementation Documents 
Registration Instructions – FRBNY instructions and documents to be completed by issuers 
seeking to qualify to utilize the CPFF, consisting of (1) the Issuer Registration Form, (2) 
Qualification Certification, and (3) Eligible Program information Form and Certification of 
FDIC Debt Guarantee. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/RegistrationInstructions.pdf
.  
Issuer Registration Form and Qualification Certification – document pursuant to which an 
issuer provided information necessary to determine its qualification, size of its Maximum Face 
Value, designated type of CP to be issued and issuing dealer, calculated and paid 
facility/registration fee, and agreed-to program terms. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/RegistrationInstructions.pdf
. 
Eligible Program Information Form – used by the issuer to list its CP programs that were 
eligible to participate in the CPFF. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/RegistrationInstructions.pdf
. 
Certification of FDIC Debt Guarantee – used by the issuer to certify that it was a participant in 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s) Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program 
(TLGP), that the CP that it sells to the CPFF will be FDIC-guaranteed under the TLGP, and 








Investment Management Agreement (October 20, 2008) and Amendment (April 7, 2010) – 
agreement between CPFF LLC and PIMCO pursuant to which PIMCO provided investment 
management services in regards to the CPFF, and amendment which adjust fees and provides 
for a more limited volume of services through June 2010. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_IMA_Agreement.pdf. 
 
Administration Agreement – agreement, dated October 20, 2008, among CPFF LLC, the FRBNY, 
as managing member of the LLC, and State Street in its capacity as administrator, providing 
for administration services for the CPFF. [The Custodian Agreement (page 22) and related Fee 
Letter (page 48) are included here.] 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_Administration_Agree
ment.pdf. 
Custodian Agreement [Page 22 of the Administration Agreement] – agreement, dated October 
20, 2008, between CPFF LLC and State Street, whereby State Street would provide custodian 
services to the CPFF. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_Administration_Agree
ment.pdf. 
Fee Letter [Page 48 of the Administration Agreement] –letter, dated October 20, 2008, 





Statutory Reference – Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. § 343) on which the 
Fed relied in authorizing the CPFF. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRA_Section_13_Sept_19_20
08_0.pdf. 
Legal Memorandum – legal memorandum, dated March 9, 2009, discussing the CPFF in light 
of the requirements of FRA Section 13(3) and in particular the requirement that any such 




FR Board Announces the Creation of the CPFF to Help Restore Liquidity to the Term CP 
Market (October 7, 2008) – Press release announcing the creation of the CPFF, articulating the 




FRBNY Announces That PIMCO Will Provide Asset Management Services in Support of the 
CPFF (October 8, 2008) – FRBNY press release announcing that it would contract with PIMCO, 
a large investment firm, to provide asset management services related to the CPFF. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_PIMCO.pdf. 
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Joint Statement by Treasury, the Fed, and the FDIC (October 14, 2008) – statement regarding 
actions, including the CPFF, being taken to strengthen confidence in financial institutions and 
foster functioning of the credit markets. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Joint%20Statement%20by
%20Treasury,%20Federal%20Reserve%20and%20FDIC.pdf. 
FR Board Announces Additional Details Regarding the CPFF (October 14, 2008) – Press 





FRBNY Releases Expanded CPFF FAQs (October 17, 2008) – Short FRBNY press release 
announcing that it had published an updated set of CPFF FAQs. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_FAQ_Oct08.pdf. 
FRBNY Issues Instructions and Documents for CPFF Registration (October 20, 2008) –   
Archived CPFF registration instruction form developed in collaboration with PIMCO. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/RegistrationInstructions.pdf 
Change to CPFF Eligibility Requirements (January 23, 2009) – FRBNY announcement of a 
change to CPFF eligibility requirements to clarify that the CPFF will not purchase ABCP from 




FR Board Announces the Extension of Five Liquidity Facilities Including the CPFF through 
October 30, 2009 (February 3, 2009) –  FRB press release discussing the extension of various 
crisis-era liquidity facilities that were originally set to expire on April 30, 2009. 
Thhttps://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fed_announces_ext_throu
gh_Oct_30_2009_existing_liquidity_progs.pdf. 
Federal Reserve System Publishes Annual Financial Statements (April, 23, 2009)  – FR 
Board’s 2008 combined financial statements for the combined Federal Reserve banks (which 




FR Board Announces Extensions of, and Modifications to, a Number of Its Liquidity Programs 
Including the CPFF (June 25, 2009) – FRB press release announcing the extension of the CPFF, 





The FRBNY Releases Updated CPFF FAQs (October 19, 2009) – FRBNY document that 








The FR Board Releases a Statement from its January 26–27 FOMC Meeting (January 27, 
2010) – Press release from the FOMC mentioning, among other things, that the CPFF would be 
closing on February 1, 2010. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_FOMC_Jan2710.pdf. 
Media Stories 
Fed’s New Tool: Business Loan Bailout (CNN Money, October 7, 2008) – News article 
discussing the lead up to and initial operations plan for the CPFF. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Isidore_2008_CNN_News_Fe
ds_new_tool.pdf 
Treasury to Guarantee Money Market Funds (New York Times, September 19, 2008) – News 
article discussing the Treasury’s backstop for money market funds. It has an aside about how 
the intervention relates to the commercial paper market. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Henriques_2008_Treasury_t
o_Guarantee_Money_market_funds.pdf 
GE Used New Fed Commercial-Paper Funding Facility (Bloomberg.com, October 27, 2008) – 
News article reporting that GE Capital, the massive financial unit of General Electric, used the 
CPFF. It also includes a short summary of the CPFF and quotes from GE spokespeople.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Layne_Bloomberg_2008_GE
_Used_CPFF.pdf 
Lending Grows – First Time since Lehman Collapse (CNN Money, October 30, 2008) – News 
article reporting how the CPFF was responsible for the first instance of growth in the CP market 
in seven weeks.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Goldman_2008_Lending_Gr
ows_since_lehman.pdf 
Key Academic Papers 
The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility (Adrian, Kimbrough, and 
Marchioni 2011) – paper providing a detailed discussion of the CPFF’s design and impact. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AdrianKimbroughMarchion
i2011_0.pdf.  
The Commercial Paper Market, the Fed, and the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis (Anderson and 
Gascon 2009) – paper reviewing the history of the CP market (including its structure and key 
relationship to MMMFs) and presenting a detailed discussion of the market crisis and the 




When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 
(Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010) – paper discussing the impact of various Fed programs on the 




0.pdf.   
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The Real Effects of Government Liquidity Provision: Evidence from the Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility (Li 2015), How Effective Was the Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility? Evidence from Stock Performance and Loan Provisions (March 25, 2014) 
– paper examining the effects of the CPFF and concluding that participation delivered value in 
two forms: (1) participants experienced improved stock performance; and (2) a positive spill-
over effect occurred as participants increased loans and lowered yields to their relationship 
customers. 
SSRN. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Li2015_1.pdf. 
Ranking of the 82 Borrowers under the Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding 





Federal Reserve Crisis Response E: Commercial Paper Market Facilities, YPFS Case Study 
2015-1E-v.1 (Wiggins and Metrick, Unpublished) – case study examining the CPFF and other 






Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (McNamara 2016) – YPFS case 
study discussing the Treasury-FRB efforts to backstop the money market funds sector in the 
midst of a run. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/sites_default_files_private_C
ases_YPFS_Temporary-Guarantee-Program-for-Money-Market-Funds-13Jan16-v1.pdf.   
Reports/Assessments  
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of Inspector General. OIG 2010. 
The Federal Reserve’s Section 13(3) Lending Facilities to Support Overall Market Liquidity: 
Function, Status, and Risk Management. Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Office of Inspector General, November 16, 2010. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRS_OIG_FRS_Lending_Facil
ities_Report_11-16-10_0.pdf. 
CPFF LLC Financial Statements 2008–09 – audited financial statements of CPFF LLC for the 




CPFF LLC Financial Statements 2009–10 – audited financial statements of CPFF LLC as of May 
31, 2010, and for the period from January 1, 2010, through May 31, 2010, and as of and for the 








CPFF Transaction Data – Excel files of transaction data regarding the loans made by the FRBNY 
to CPFF LLC and purchases of CP by CPFF LLC. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_Transaction_Data.pdf. 
Domestic Open Market Operations during 2008 – report prepared for the FR FOMC by the 




Domestic Open Market Operations during 2009 – report prepared for the FR FOMC by the 
Markets Group of the FRBNY discussing various lending programs including the reasons for 
implementing the CPFF and its relation to other programs focused on the CP markets (January 
2010). https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_OMO_09.pdf. 
Domestic Open Market Operations during 2010 – report prepared for the FR FOMC by the 
Markets Group of the FRBNY discussing various lending programs including the CPFF and 
characteristics and administration of the CP held (March 2011). 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_OMO_10.pdf. 
FOMC Transcript (October 7, 2008) – transcript of FR FOMC conference call on October 7, 
2008, approving the CPFF and discussing the reasons for its implementation and initial 
reactions to its announcement. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FOMC-
TranscriptOct72008.pdf. 
FOMC Transcript (October 28–29, 2009) – transcript of the FR FOMC meeting on October 28-
29, 2008, discussing the CPFF, its reception, and impact. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FOMC-2008b.pdf. 
FRBNY Annual Reports – consolidated audited financial statements of the FRBNY for the years 
2008–11 incorporating CPFF data. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY-
AnnualReportsFinancialStatements.pdf. 
Federal Reserve Board 95th Annual Report, 2008 – compilation of policy actions taken by the 
FR Board, minutes of the FOMC meetings, and litigation occurring in 2008. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_%20AnnualReport200
8.pdf. 
Federal Reserve Monthly Reports on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet – 
reports of the FR Board prepared from June 2009 to August 2012 as part of its efforts to enhance 
transparency in connection with its lending and financial stability programs. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_ArchiveMonthlyReport
CreditLiquidityPrograms.pdf. 
Quarterly Report on Federal Reserve Balance Sheet Developments – reports containing 
similar information published subsequent to August 2012. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_Quarterly-Report-
Balance-Sheet-Developments.pdf. 
Federal Reserve Statistical Release (H.15) (October 20, 2008) – reporting on the assets and 
liabilities of CPFF LLC, consolidated with the assets and liabilities of the FRBNY, its sole 
beneficiary. The report also notes that the Federal Reserve Board’s monthly H.4.1 statistical 
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release, “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Depository Institutions and Condition Statement 
of Federal Reserve Banks,” was modified to include information related to CPFF LLC. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_%20H.15ReleaseSelect
edInterestRatesOctober202008.pdf. 
Office of Inspector General Report (November 16, 2010) – audit report by the FR’s OIG that 
discusses the function and status of the various Fed lending programs, including the CPFF, and 
that identifies the risks in each facility. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRS_OIG_FRS_Lending_Facil
ities_Report_11-16-10_0.pdf. 
Testimony of Chairman Bernanke (November 18, 2008) – testimony of the Fed chairman 
before the House Committee on Financial Services discussing the Fed liquidity programs 
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